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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
Anvnss PosssssroN-TACKING.-To a suit in ej ectment, defendant pleaded,
(I) the statute of limitations of seven years, claiming adverse possession
for that length of time; (2) also twenty years' adverse possessiOn as a ibasis

for the presumption of a grant. The possession relied upon is partially that
of defendant's predecessor, between whom and defendant there was no
privity. Helcl, (1) the defense of the statute of limitations is without merit.
Successive possessions cannot be tacked to make up the period of that statute
unless connected by privity; (2) but no privity is necessary to raise the presumption of a grant where the possession relied upon is continuous for
twenty years, and this defense must prevail Ferguson v. Prince, (Tenn.
1916) 190 s.
548.
The defendant's claim should have been rested on the statute of limitations, and not on the presumption of a lost grant. That statute should be
considered as one of repose, and operate to defeat a title to land continuously
held by adverse claimants for the statutory period, regardless of privity.
This is the law of England, but is the minority rule in this country. Rich v.
Naffziger, 255 I11. 98, 99 N. E. 34I;. Wishart v. McKnight, 178 Mass. 356. The
court reached the proper conclusion by employing the fiction of a lost grant,
but the presumption of such a grant is correctly invoked only where the
right claimed is an easement in. land, and not the land itself. See 11 MICH.
L. Rsv.245.

w.

ATToRNEY AND CI.ntNT-QUANTU:M. 1h:RUIT.-Plaintiffs, who were attorneys
at Los Angeles, wired Mumford, who lived in New Jersey, that he was heir to
an estate in California; sent some information and details which were used by
Mumford; and asked to be employed as associate attorneys, stating terms. Later
they forwarded other information at Mumford's request, and were twice consulted by Mumford's New Jersey attorney as to possible employment. They
now seek to recover quantum meruit for services rendered. Held, they are
entitled to no compensation. In re Mumford's Estate, (Cal. 1916) 16o Pac. 667.
To support such recovery, there must be an evident showing that the
services were rendered with some understanding or expectation by both
parties that compensation was to be made. In re McP/1.erson's Estate, 129
La. 182; Paul v. Wilbur, 18g Mass•. 48. And the court found no such understanding in the principal case. On the contrary, it found that the information was given under the understanding that it was necessary to an intelligent
decision whether or not plaintiff's services were necessary, and not that they
should be paid therefor. This presumption arose from plaintiff's own letter,
stating that Mumford was "to be put to no expense unless we are employed
and are successful," and this was strengthened by the fact that the plaintiffs
said nothing as to their claim when it became apparent that they would not
be employed. It is clear that there can be no recovery where the attorney
acts without defendant's knowledge or consent, even though it be admitted
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that his services were beneficial and the result valuable. Morris Ci:' Crow v.
Kesterson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1905), 88 S. W. 277. But there may be a recovery
on an implied contract on proof of knowledge of defendant that plaintiff was
rendering services for him as his attorney, he expressing no dissent to their
rendition. Davis v. Walker, 131 Ala. 204, 31 So. 554 In Paul v. Wilbur, supra,
an attorney drew up the necessary papers for the incorPoration of a railroad,
which was sold by the attorney's client to defendant, who proceeded to consum:.
mate the incorporation plans. At his request, plaintiff attorney delivered said
papers to defendant, and it was held that the defendant must have anticipated
paying for said services, and was therefore liable. The attorney's rights against
defendant were held not to be affected by an agreement, unknown to him,
that defendant was taking title to the road for the benefit of the original
client, who was to furnish the papers drawn by plaintiff. In Succession of
Kernan, 105 La. 592, 30 So. 239, one of the several parties interested in the
succession employed plaintiff attorney professedly for hunself and his coheirs. The latter stood by, making, no objection, and availing themselves
of plaintiff's efforts, and it was held that they were also liable to him for fees.
This case was relied on by plaintiff in In re McPhers~s Estate, supra, but
there the one employing plaintiff did not profess to be employing him for
the other co-heirs, but on the contrary, made them defendants in part of the
litigation. The fact that the other, co-heirs, through their attorneys, joined
plaintiff and his client in another phase of the suit, in which they were equally
benefited, was held not to render them liable in any way to plaintiff. The
fact that they had employed attorneys to represent them was emphasized
by the court as clearly showing that they had never considered plaintiff as
being employed for them.
BANKRUPTCY-DiscHARGF: BARRF:D llY FRAunur.F:N'l' TRANsittt.-An insolvent
debtor, owning a number of stores, with intention to break the leases on two
of the unprofitalble ones, organized a corPoration, of which he held all the stock
except a few shares held by his wife and another, conveyed to it the remaining stores, and after the appointment of his trustee in bankruptcy, delivered the corPorate stock to such trustee. Held, that the conveyance of
his property to the corPoration hindered and delayed the creditors, hence
was fraudulent as to them and a bar to a discharge. In re Braus, 237 Fed. 139·
When the legal effect of the conveyance is to hinder or delay creditors,
the intent will be pre&Umed regardless of actual motives. Logan v. Logan,
22 Fla. 561, I Am. St. Rep. 212; Matthews v. Thompson, 186 Mass. 14, 104
Am. St. Rep. 550. In the following cases the legal effect of transfers to corporations was held to ibe to hinder and delay creditors: Mulford v. Doremus,
6o N. J. Eq. So, 45 Atl. 688; Kelley v. Pollock and Bernheimer, 57 Fla. 459,
49 So. 93"' 131 Am. St. Rep. IIOl; Bank v. Trebein, 59 Oh. St. 316, 52 N. E.
834; Benton v. Minn. Tailoring Co., 73 Minn. 4g8, 76 N. W. 265; Kellogg v.
Douglas County Bank, 58 Kan. 43, 48 Pac. 587, 62 Am. St. Rep. 5g6. But in
the following cases the holdings were to the contrary. Plant v. Billings-Drew,
127 Mich. II, 86 N. W. 399; Scripps v. Crawford, 123 Mich. 173, 81 N. W.
1og8. Where the firm is solvent independently of the stock received in ex-

RECENT IMPORT4NT DECISIONS

437

change, there is of course no hindrance or delay. Coaldale Coal Co. v. State
Bank, 142 Pa. St. 288, 21 Atl. 8n. The decision in the instant case would
have been the same in a.11 jurisdictions since the sale "was only designed to
change the rights of creditors and to prevent the landlords from co11ecting
their rent." It would seem on principle that stock is .not the equivalent of
chattels for the purposes of the creditors "because in practice the judginent
debtor must buy in the stock at the sale, and then try to get possession of
the chattels and sett them. He may or may not succeed in this without substantial delay or hindrance. That wi11 depend upon how surely he can
disregard the corporate form, which in tum depends in part upon whether
he. is the only shareholder, and· whether there have been other. debts contracted by the corporation. Even then he must have another sate."
BANKRUPTCY-Plu;~Nci>s.-Jones obtained money from a bank on a
note to which he had forged the names of indorsers; within four months
prior to bankruptcy, and white he was insolvent, he procured his brotherin-law Dean, who had knowledge of the facts, to "take up" the notes, giving
the latter a mortgage on alt of his (Jones') property. §6ob of the Bankruptcy Act provides that a transfer within four months before bankruptcy
shalt be voidable if the person receiving the same has reason to believe
it was intended to give a preference; §67e provides that if a debtor within
such period makes any transfer "with the intent and purpose on his part to
hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of them," it shall be rendered·
nu11 and void except as to purchasers in good faith and for a fair present
consideration. In the trustee's· suit to set aside the mortgage, held, that it
was not voidable as a preference under §6ob, but was nutt and void under
§67e. Dean v. Davis, 37 Sup. Ct. 130.
The mortgage was not a preference within the meaning of §6ob because
it was given to secure a contemporary rather than a pre-existing debt and
because its effect was to prefer the bank rather than Dean. But because Jones
knew that he was insolvent, that he was making a preferential payment, and
that bankruptcy would result, the lower courts were justified in concluding
that the intent (or obviously necessary effect) of the transfer was "to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors" within the meaning of §67e, the operation of
which is much broader than §6ob, and "that Dean, who knowing the facts
co-operated in the bankrupt's fraudulent purpose, lacked the saving good
faith." In the decision are collected other cases in which it is held that a
mortgage is a fraudulent conveyance where taken as security for a loan
which the tender knows is to be used to prefer favored creditors; also those
holding the contrary where the lender does not know that improper payments to favored creditors are intended. Van Jdenstine v. National Discount
Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582, and Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, are distinguished on
the grounds that in the former case the ptedgee was found to have had no
knowledge of the debtor's fraudulent intent, and in the latter case it was
found that the debtor had no intent to hi~der, delay or defraud creditors.
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BANKROMCY-PluoRITY ro Woim:HtN AND S:stvANTS.-Bankrupt milk
company engaged claimants to haul milk from surrounding producers to the
factory, payment to be made according to the amount hauled, with a fixed
minimum, the amounts per hundred paid to claimants being deducted from
the price paid to the producers; the claimants had their own routes, supplied
their own teams and equipment, and were entitled, if the amount of milk
· hauled warranted, to engage assistants. §64b of the Bankruptcy Act gives
priority to claims for wages due to "workmen, clerks, or servants." Held,
that though claimants performed seivices and engaged in manual labor, they
were not "workmen" or "servants" within the' meaning of the act. In re
Footville Condensed Milk Co., 237 Fed. 136.
Subordination and personal subservience to the employer, the element
which, says the court, affords the ultimate test, is lacking in this case, just
as it is in the case of draymen, cabmen, expressmen, or other independent
contractors. The relation of master and servant excludes the right to
assign or delegate the performance of the obligation assumed. Using one's
own wagons, tools, etc., does not alone remove one from the servant to the
independent contractor class. In re Yoder, 127 Fed. 894; Sproks v. Lackawanna Dairy Co., 189 Fed. 287. Neither the editor of a newspaper, nor the
manager of a business, even if he incidentally performs menial or clerical
service or makes sales, is a workman or servant-although they are ultimately
subservient to their employers. In re Greenberger, 203 Fed. 583; In re Zotti,
178 Fed. 287; In re Crown Point Brush Co., 200 Fed. 882; Blessing v. Blanchord, 223 Fed. 35; In re Continental Paint Co., 220 Fed. 189. But a travelling salesman paid by way of commissions, or a bookkeeper or stewardthough incidentally serving as directors or officers-are servants. In re New
England Thread Co., 158 Fed. 778; In re H. 0. Roberts Co., 193 F:ed. 294;
In re Swan Co.,, 194 Fed. 74g. It is difficult exactly to define the degree of,
or proximity of subservience to the ultimate source of authority necessary
to place one in one class or another.
BANKRUP'l.'CY-PROMISts MAnr: AF'ttR Fn.ING o'J! PtTITION.-Defendant
had ·been adjudicated a vofontary bankrupt, plaintiff being one of his creditors. Defendant, wishing to obtain money to effect a composition, promised to pay plaintiff's claim in full if the latter would assist him; plaintiff
accordingly endorsed defendant's note for the amount needed, and the composition was carried through. After discharge, defendant repeated his promise, but without 'further consideration. Defendant paid the note, but refused to pay the balance of plaintiff's claim, and pleaded his discharge when
sued by plaintiff. Held, that the promise to pay the balan~e of plaintiff's
claim was fraudulent and void. Lieblein v. George, (Mich. 1916) 100 N.
w. 538.
In Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 57 L. Ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in a case involving facts apparently
identical, held that the promise was good and was not discharged, because
made after the filing of the petition. The Michigan Supreme Court does not
refer to Zavelo v. Reeves, and its decision is explicable only on the assump-
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tion that its attention was not called to that case by counsel. As to the
court's statement that defendant's promise was fraudulent and void, it is
only necessary to answer, with the Za:uelo case, that though an advantage
accrued to the plaintiff as the result of the advancement, the pleadings do not
show that it came as the result of fraud or collusion.
C.Al!R.n:Rs-P.ssoNAI. !NJURY.-Deceased boarded a pay-as-you-enter car,
which was so crowded that be, together with many others, was compelled
to ride upon the rear platform, from which he was thrown and killed by a
sudden lurch of the car. His wife brings this action, and appeals from a
directed verdict for defendant below. Held, ·it w.as error for court below to
direct a verdict for defendant. La.rskowski v. Detroit United Ry., (Mich.
1916) 159 N. W. 530.
Plaintiff in this case presented a sufficient case for the consideration of
the jury, inasmuch as the deceased was riding on the platform on the implied
invitation of the defendant. He was admitted when the interior was full,
and this was evidence of negligence on the part of defendant, but was not
negligence per se in deceased. The question should have been submitted to
the jury. In the case of Camden, etc. Ry. v. Hoosey, 99 Pa. 492, the Pennsylvania court held that the plaintiff was guilty of such negligence in standing on the platform for several minutes as to defeat his right of recovery
for injuries resulting from being pitched therefrom, even though every
·seat on the train was taken, and the aisles crowded, for it appeared that be
could have found standing room inside the cars. The court stood four to
three on the point. It was intimated that had be been "compelled thereto
by circumstances," it would have been a question for the jury. Most courts
disapprove of this strict ruling, due to a consideration of the congested condition of traffic which prevails today. Failure to provide seats was held to
prevent a company from taking advantage of a rule prohibiting passengers
from standing on the platform in Willis v. Ry., 32 Barb. 399. And the general holding is that if the company accepts one as a passenger on the platform or steps, even though he might have found standing room inside, be
is not guilty of such negligence as defeats his right of recovery. Anderson
v. Ry., 42 Ore. 505, 71 Pac. 659. And although some courts hold a company to be negligent if it permits such overcrowding as makes it necessary
for passengers to ride on the platform (Stuchly v. Ry., 182 Ill App. 337), the
general rule is that the company is not liable per se for injury due to overcrowding on the platform, but only for want of due care in preventing such
injuries as might reasonably be expected to result from such overcrowding.
This rests on the theory that the public today acquiesces in overcrowding.
Lehberger v. Ry., 79 N. J. Law 134, 74 Atl. 272; McCumher v. Ry., 207 Mass.
559, 93 N. E. 6g8; Anderson v. Ry., supra. But allowing passengers on the
platform, the company owes them a degree of care proportionate to the
danger to which they are exposed. LeBarge v. Ry., 138 Ia. 6g1, u6 N. W. 816.
In the case of Norvell v. Ry., 67 W. Va. 467, 68 S. E. 288, the company was
held liable for injuries to one necessarily on the platform, unless such
passenger had contributed to the injury by his own negligence, thus holding
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it negligence per se to allow overcrowding. .Pennsylvania requires toward
one necessarily on the platform only such care as toward any other passenger. Pi/dish v. Ry., 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 195. In this case the theory of
the Camden case, supra, was followed, it being held that one remaining on
the platform when he might have had standing room inside assumes all the
risks of his position. But this is contrary to the weight of authority.
CoNS'l'ITUTlONAI. LAw-IN'ttRSTAT£ CoMMtRct AND PoL1c:e Powr:a.-The
Federal Supreme Court on January 22, 1917, rendered decisions in three cases,
appealed from the district courts of Michigan, South Dakota and Ohio,
wherein the so called "Blue Sky'' laws were upheld as constitutional These
laws get their popular name from the fact that they were made to regulate
those promoters whose promises were "as limitless as the blue sky." Briefly stated, it was held that reasonable restrictions upon the operations of
those engaged in the sale of "securities" was not a violation of the interstate
commerce clause but was a justifiable exercise of the police power of the
state. Merrick v. Halsey & Co., (Michigan), 37 Sup. Ct. 227; Caldwell v.
Siou1' Falls Stock Yards Co., (South Dakota), 37 Sup. Ct. 224, and Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Company, (Ohio), 37 Sup. Ct. 217.
·A full discussion of these cases appears on pages 36g-385 of this issue.
°CoNsT1TuTlONAI. LAw-RSL1c1ous ·Lmr:RTY.-A statute of Alabama made
it a misdemeanor for any person to treat or offer to treat diseases of
human beings by any system of treatment whatsoever without a license.
Con:e, §7564. An ordinance of the city of Birmingham made all misdemeanors against the laws of the State also offences against the city. Defendant, who was not a licensed physician, employed prayer in treating a
patient for various diseases, but also examined and massaged the affected
parts. He contended that he was exercising his religion as embraced in the
teachings of the Altrurian Church, and that the ordinance denied religious
liberty in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and the State
of Ala:bama. Held, that the ordinance was constitutional and also that the
defendant practiced medicine without a license within the meaning· of the
ordinance. Fealey v. City-of Birmingham, (Ala. 1916) 73 So. 29().
It is well settled that the regulation of the practice of medicine is a valid
exercise of the police power. State v. McAninch, 172 Ia. 9(), 154 N. W. 399;
People v. Tom J. Chong, 28 Cal. App. 121, 151 Pac. 553; In re Ambler, I I
Okl: Cr. 449, 148 Pac. 1o61; McNaughton v. Johnson, 37 Sup. Ct. 178. The
principal case did not decide that prayers alone without recourse to material or human agencies would constitute practicing medicine under the
statute, since the defendant did not limit his operations to mere prayers.
This question was decided in the case of People v. Cole, (N. Y. 1916) u3
N. E. 790. In that case the defendant was indicted for practicing medicine
without registration. At the trial he proved that he was a member of the
Christian Science Church and that he gave a "treatment'' by interposing with
God that the disease might be cured, it being a tenet of the church that such
prayer would completely cure the disease. The court in deciding the case
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held that the defendant did practice medicine within the meaning of the
statute, but a new trial was ordered because the trial court in instructing
the jury failed to recognize a clause in the statute excepting the practic~ of
the religious tenets of any church. The reasoning in this case was followed
in PeoPle v. McTier, I84 IU. App. 635. In the recent case of Crane v. Jahn-so1i, 37 Sup. Ct. I76, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the validity of a California statute regulating the practice of medicine, which specifically excepted "treatment by prayer" and the "practice of religion." In
that case the person objecting to the statute did not pretend to use prayer
in his treatment.·
CoN'l'RACTs-MuTUALITY.-Plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement in writing whereby defendant, a manufacturer of sugar, agreed to
sell, and plaintiff as a wholesale dealer in groceries, agreed to buy, all of
plaintiff's "August requirements" of sugar at a fixed price. Sugar advanced in price. Plaintiff demanded of defendant an amount of sugar alleged
to be the ordinary and normal quantity used by plaintiff for his trade. Defendant declined to deliver. Held, the co,ntract was invalid for want of
mutuality. Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 237 Fed. 278.
That the plaintiff's obligation to buy none of its "August requirements"
from any person other than the defendant:, was detriment tQ the promisee, and
sufficient consideration to support th~ contract, the court agreed. The.presence of consideration should furnish the only element of mutuality required.
The court further declared tha,t an agreement to buy and sell the requirements of an established business in which the use of the thing "required"
is but incidental to the carrying on of the business itself is valid and should
be upheld, but that invalidity results when the amount of the commodity
to be purchased is determined by the mere wish, desire, or caprice of the
yurchaser. This distinction rests on no sound legal principle. The demand
for "certainty," and for the elimination of "caprice" has probably resulted
from two considerations, vi2;: the desire to simplify the question of damages,
and the good policy of minimizing a large element of speculation which exists
in such contracts. But the difficulty of ascertaining the damages of a breach
can in no way touch the' validity of the agreement, and if the state is to·fur-.
nish the business sagacity which the parties lack, it should be offered by the
legislature, not the courts. In a recent, and better reasoned, case involving
the same question it was held that if the intention of the contract be clear,
the mere uncertainty of the amount involved does not invalidate it. Ramey
Lumber Co. v. Schroeder Lumber Co., 237 Fed. 39. This is sound. It cannot
be explained on principle how an option which results from the very terms
of the contract, and for which there is admittedly sufficient consideration,
can defeat the validity of the agreement.
CoRPORATIONs-Ho1.mNG STOCK IN loCAI. CoRPORATION BY Foruo;rGN CoRPOltATION IS "DOING BusrNJ;ss" IN TH£ STATS.-A Maine corporation owned
practically all the stock of an Illinois corporation organized to sell life insurance. Under its Maine charter the corporation could not sell life insur-·
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ance. Under the Illinois statutes it :was unlawful for one corporation to
hold the stock of another. Held, that the Maine corporation was "doing
business" in Illinois so as to make it amenable to the Illinois statutes prohibiting such holding, and since the whole scheme was an attempt by the
promoters to do indirectly what they could not do directly, it must be declared
illegal. Central Life Securities Co. v. Smith, et al., (C. C. A. 1916), 236
Fed. 170.
The weight of authority is clearly against this case. Mannington v. Hocking Valley Ry., 183 Fed. 133; Peterson v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 U.S.
364; Conley v. Mathieso'n Alkali Wks., 190 U. S 4o6; People v. American Bell
Telephone Co., n7 N. Y. 241; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.,
29 Fed. 17; Gilchrist v. Helena, &c Ry., 47 Fed. 593; Toledo Traction, Light
& Power Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643. And the weight of reason seems also
with the. majority rule. Thus in People v. Bell Co., supra, RUGER, J., says:
"Doing business" in the state "must be determined from the actual character
of the business carried on
and not from the existence of any unexercised powers reserved to it by its contracts; for the material question is
whether it has, in fac~ done business within the state, and, if so, what was
the nature, character and extent, and not whether it pcssesses the natural
or contractual right to carry on such business." And in United States v.
American &c. Co., supra, JACKSON, J., pomts out that it is not sufficient to give
jurisdiction in personam over foreign corporations that they have property
rights, however extensive, within the district, or that they have pecuniary
interests, however valuabl~, in a business managed and conducted by others.
So control or ownership of stock is merely a status, or at most, a power;
it is a right, not a transaction; passive, not active. It is elementary that a
corp0ration holding shares ·is a distinct entity from the corporation whose
shares are held, and that the latter is not the agent of the former so as to
confer personal liability, unless secondarily by statute. In the instant case
no reasons are assigned for departing from the majority rule. Three cases
are cited: Col. Tru,rt Co. v. M. B. Works, 172 Fed. 313; Dittman v. Dist.
Co. of Am., 64 N. J. Eq. 537; and Martin v. Offlo Stove Co., 78 Ill. App. 105.
Of these the latter two are not in point but Col. Trust Co. v. M. B. Works not
only fully sustains the instant case but points out the basis for the differentiation from the main line of authority. In that case a Delaware corporation was organized to hold the stock of a Pennsylvania brick manufacturing corporation, in order to evade the stricter corporation laws of Pennsylvania. The court simply proceeded to strip away the corporate cloak assumed
to evade the law. See Metcalf v. Arnold, IIO Ala. 18o; United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Co., 234 Fed. 127, IS Mic:B:. L. REv, 78. So in the instant case it appears that the incorporators were, as the court states, trying
to do indirectly what they could not legally accomplish .directly. In all the
cases cited for the majority rule it will be found that the holding was wholly
innocent in its purpose, and in all but Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works,
supra, it was merely incidental to the rights of the parties involved, so that
there were neither motives of public policy nor fraud to justify interference
by the courts. Caesar v. Capell, 83 FecL 403; Blodgett v. Lanyon Zinc Co.,
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I20 Fed. 8g3. Thus it seems plain that the instant case is limited in its effe.ct
to removing from the application of the general rule ·those holding companies
organized primarily to evade the law.

.

CoRPORATIONs-Issm: oF STOCK FOR PA'mN'tS UNDr:R MICHIGAN S'tA'tU'ttS.
-The corporation was capitalized at $2oo,ooo of which $Ioo,ooo was subscribed and $2<>,200 paid in cash and property. Also a contract was entered
into by which $10,000 in stock was issued to A, B, & C in return for their
Promise to assign the American patent, when it ~hould be issued, to an air
compressor for automobiles. Later, when it was found impossible to obtain
an American patent, the directors of the corporation voted to accept the
foreign patents already held by A, B, & C in lieu of the American patent.
Held, that this contract was in fraud of the other stockholders and that the
stock issued to A, B, & C should be delivered up to be canceled, and
they barred from sharing in distribution of corporate assets on dissolution.
In re American Air Compressor Co., (Mich. I916), I6o N. W. 388. ·
Clause 6 of §2 of the General Incorporation Laws of Michigan (How.
ANN. S'tA't. §9533) provides that 10% of the authorized capital stock of a
corporation .must be paid in cash or property, and in the latter case there
must be affidavits by at least three of the incorporators averring actual transfer to the corporation, and swearing to the actual value. Here it seems that
$10,000 in stock was to be issued on the mere possibility of a patent, and
it is difficult to conceive how a patent right in futuro could have been transferred to the corporation or how it could have satisfied the further requirement of the statute that it be ·transferable by the corporation and subject
to levy and execution by the corporate creditors. The matter was not brought
up in the case and was not mentioned in the opinion, as it was not necessary
to decide the case. This is regrettabl~. In many corporations a.large amount
of stock is issued for patent rights. The Michigan statute is in terms most
rigid. The evaluation of a patent right, which must ·be sworn to, is a difficult matter at best, and it is of the greatest importance to a large number
of honest and well-intentioned citizens that the courts define just what is required of incorporators who wish to issue shares for patent rights which are
necessarily more or less conjectural in value. ·
Evmr:Ncr:-EXPr:R't Tr:s'tIMONY NO't .ADMissmr.r: ON Qur:snoN oF SIGNA'ttrar: BY MARK.-A will was signed by a feeble man, 92 years of age, who
made a mark as a substitute for his signature. Three witnesses testified that
the testator had made the mark; t,wo testifying that the testator had made
the mark unassisted, while the third testified that he had aided the testator's
feeble hand in making the mark. Plaintiffs contesting the will offered expert testimony to show that this-was not the mark of the testator. Held,
that the court properly excluded the testimony, as a mark is not "writing"
within the meaning of New York Laws I88o, Ch. 36, and Laws I888, Ch. 555,
which permit the comparison of writing by experts. In re Caift:ey's Will,
(I916) I6I N. Y. Supp. 277.
.
The court decided this case upon the authority of In re Hopki~, 172 N.
Y. 36o, 65 N. E. 173, 65 L. R. A. 95, 9:? Am. St. "Rep. 746,- w~ere )i wa5 ~-
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pressly held that a mark was not writing wjthin the meaning of the above
statutes. A close examination of those statutes shows that they only extend
the field of expert testimony "and do not declare what constitutes writing,
so that the court would have decided that a mark is not writing subject to
comparison by experts, without the existence of the statute. The cases holding with the instant case go on the theory that these disputed marks have
no prevailing characteristic which would enable an expert to speak, with any
·degree of certainty, as to the identity of the person who made them; hence
a comparison is improper. Some of ·the cases holding to the above theory
are Jackson, e~ dem. Van Dusen v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. 144. 4 Am. Dec.
330; Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153; Shinkle v. Crock, 17 Pa. St. 159· Another line of cases go upon the theory that, since the jury must compare the
mark to see if it is genuine, the companson should be made more intelligible
by comparisons made by experts. They hold that 5uch comparison is possible; for marks made by hands trembling with old age, or by illiterate persons, have characteristics of their own differing from those made by steady
hands and with intelligent design. State v. Tice, 30 Ore. 457, 48 Pac. 367.
On the question of comparison of cross-marks there is also a division of
opinion. Travers v. Snyder, JS 111. App. 379, holds that cross-marks can not.
be distinguished so as to produce dependable evidence unless by some strong
proof it js shown that the ;signer's mark had some peculiar distinguishing·
characteristic. See also State v. Byrd, 93 N. C. 624- The case of Shank v.
Butsch, 28 Ind. 19, strongly intimates that cross-marks are writing and subject to the same rule as other signatures.
I

'

'

.

Evm~N~-UNAUTHtN'tICATtD BooKs oF ENTRY.-Plaintiff claims on contracts for sawing lumber for the defendant. Carruth, an employee of plaintiff,
kept account of the work done on tallylboards atthe mill, from which, as well
as from oral reports ot Carruth, plaintiif made up the book admitted in
evidence. Carruth was out of the state and was not produced to authenticate these figures, nor was any attempt made to obtain his deposition; on
this ground defendant objected to the admission of the book. Held, this book
. was properly admitted, on grounds of convenience and necessity, and that
such admission must be left to the discretion of the trial court. Squires v.
O'Connell, (Vt. 1916) 99 Atl._ 268.
The court justified the entry of the book without authentication on grounds
of practical convenience. Formerly, when employers, engaged in small in' dustries, had only a few employees, strict rules of authentication may have
been quite practicable; lbut nowadays large concerns employ thousands of
men, many of whom are obliged to make individual-reports from which the
.books must finally be made up, and the strict rule would work severe inconvenience. The courts are facing this practical difficulty, and are as above,
leaving it to the discretion of the trial court to determine when such authentication may be dispensed with. The reliability of the present systems
of bookkeeping as opposed to the old slipshod methods, seems to be another
reason for relaxing the rigid rules of authentication. 2 W1GM0Rt, Evm.,
§§1521, 1530;. Griflith v. Boston & Maine Ry. Co., 87 Vt. 278, 8g Atl. 220;
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Osborne v. Grand T. Ry. Co., 87 Vt. 104, 88 Atl. 512, Ann. Cas. 1916C 74
Some cases hold that if the party who made the entry cannot be compelled
to appear, his testimony may be dispensed with. Vinol v. Gilman, 21 .W.
Va. 321, 45 Am. Rep. 562. Many courts still apply strictly the rule requiring
authentication. Randall v. Borden, ('!'ex. Civil App.), 164 S. W. lo63; Little
Rock Granite Co. v. Dallas County, 66 Fed. 522, C. C. A. 620
EVIn~NC£-V.AI,US oF Suvicr:s Musmu:n BY UNION SCAI,~-Plaintiff sued
on a mechanic's lien to recover for labor and materials used in doing plumbing for defendant. Evidence was admitted showing the union rate of wages
for journeymen plumbers. Defendant objected because it had not 'been shown
that the contract was based upon union prices. Held, that the trial court
properly admitted the evidence. Schalich v. Bell, (Cat. 1916), 161 Pac. 983.
In determining the value of services courts have quite generally excluded
evidence tending to show· rewards for similar services in analogous cases,
because it raises too many collateral issues; yet it would seem that such
a method of showing the proper amount of recovery would be most accurate. Harris v. Russell, 93 Ala. 59, 9 So. 541; McKnight v. Detroit & M.
Ry. Co., 135 Mich. 307, 97 N. W. 772. In Seurer v. Horst, 31 Minn. 479, 18
N. W .. 283, proof of wages received by another employee of defendant was
excluded as not being evidence of the value of plaintiff's services. 'l'o the
same ef,Iect is Forey v. Western Stage Co.,' 19 Ia. 535. 'l'o show the reasonableness of fees charged for services of a physician or an attorney, evidence
is usually rejected as to fees c;harg<;_d in previous similar cases. Collins v.
Fowler, 4 Ala. 647; Robbins v. Harvey, 5 Conn. 335. Some courts allow
value received for similar services to be shown, but in such cases it is always
difficult to show sufficient similarity. Maurice v. Hunt, 8o Ark. 476, 97 S. W.
664; Peters v. Davenport, 104 Ia. 625, 74 N. W. 6; Kram.men v. Meridean
M. Co.; 58 Wis. 399, 17 N. W. 22. '!'he practical·difficulty of establishing the
value of personal services is ·well illustrated in a New York case where the
plaintiff had personally cared for a very corpulent man, kept his house,
and done his sewing. Plaintiff's witiiess was allowed to show what she was
accustomed to pay for such services under similar circumstances. '!'he court
recognized the difficulty of the situation and remarked, "In this we see no
error. It was, as we have said, the best that the situation permitted the
plaintiff to do." Edgecombe v. Buckliout; 146 N. Y. 332, 40 N. E. 991, 28
L. R. A. 816. In view of the present difficultj of determining the value of
services of the various trades, it w:ould seem that the union scale of wages
would be a' dependable and fair basis. Incidentally, the court's recognition
of union wages as a fair scale offers a bit of encouragement to labor organizations.

Cusro:m;Rs BY FoIWU EiMa number of years the defendant was a driver and solicitor
for the plaintiff laundry company. He left the employ of th~ latter suddenly and began soliciting the plaintiff's customers for a rival laundry. Few,
if any, of the customers knew of the defendant's change of employment.
INJUNCTION-To Prum:N'r SoI.ICI'rA'rION OF

no~-For
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',the lower coitrt ·granted an injuttction restraining the defendant from sOliciting the business, but not from ,receiving the laundry, of the plaintiff's
'customers. The plaintiff appealed, contending that the defendant should be
restramed from receiving laundry f!"om the plaintiff's customers. Held, the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed. New Method Laundry Co. v.
MacCann., (Calif. I9I6) I6I Pac. 990.
·
An express agreement not to use business secrets, which an employee has
learned, iS not necessary. in order to grant equitable relief. Stevens & Co. v.
Snles, 29-R. I. 399, ·7I·Atl. 802, 20 L. R. A. N. S. 933; MacBeth-Evans Glass
Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688. The ground of the jurisdiction
ls
prev~t . a breach of the trust and confidence necessary between employer and ~uiployee In Empire Steam Laundfy Co. v. Lozier, I65 Cal 9S,
130 Pae; n8o, 44 L. R. .A. N. S. II59, the same court held, in a case precisely similar, that the defendant should be ··restrained from soliciting or
receiving laundry from the plaintiff's customers. The decree in this case
has 1been criticized as being too broad. See I CAI.. L. Rtv. 38s. It is possible
that even the decree in the principal case might be said to be too broad.
There are some well considered cases which hold that an employee may
roticit his foOiier employer's customers so long as lie does so in ·a fair
!Danner. · Gra!'d Un{on Tea Co. v. Dodds, I64 Mich. so, I28 N. W. IClgO, 31
L. R. _A. N. S. 200;. Robb v. Green, [I89S]2 Q. B. I. This doctrine seems
just, for it puts th.e employee under no disability to earn a living because
of his former employment. There are, however, decisions in which injunctions have teen granted, quite as sweeping in extent as in the principal
ease. People's Coat, Apron 6: Towel Co. v. Light, IS7 N. Y. Supp. IS;
Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, supra.

to

MAruuA~UN~ AND Nm~-The defendant . and her uncle were
domiciled in the state of Maryland where there was a statute which forbade
a marriage between uncle and niece· and declared it to be void. They went
to Rhode Island and were married, the marriage being valid there. They
came :t>ack to Maryland and the husband died soon after, leaving mo~t of his
propertY to the defendant. The plaintiff, a nephew of the husband, sued to
have the marriage declared null and void. Held, tbat"the marriage being
valid in Rhode Island was valid in Maryland-at least could not be questioned
after the death of one of the parties. Fensterwald v. Bur.k (Md. I916) g8
Atl.. 358.
.
·The general rule is that a -marriage valid at the place where performed is
vatid everywhere. Sutton v. Warren, IO Met. (Mass.) 4s1; Harrison v.
Harrison, 22 Md. 468. To this ntle it has been held there are two exceptions:
the firiit a marriage which is regarded as inces~ous or contrary to the laws
of God and· Christendom; the ·second a marriage which is contrary j:o a
settled state policy and prol.!toited by statute. Pennegar v. State of Tennessee,
Bi Tenn. 244, 2 L. R. A. 703. ·It is universally held that a marriage between
parties in the lineal descending or ascending line or between brother and
sister is incestuous and contrary to the laws of Grid. STORY, CoNFLICT OF
ii3, II4 There, is more aifference of opinion as to marriages between

t.Aws,

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
11ncle and niece, parties in the third degree of relationship. Their marriage
is not generally regarded as being inc~tuqus and void on that ground.
Bo..wers v. Bowers, IO Rich. Eq. ( S. C.) 551; W eisbcrg v. Weisberg, g8 N. Y.
Supp. 260. In Weisberg v. W eisbcrg a marriage between an uncle and niece
was declared valid, the parties having lived together fourteen years. There
was at that time no statute against such a marriage in New York. It is now
forbidden in practically every state in the Union. Pi;cK, DoY. Ra. 2. Although such a marriage is forbidden and declared void in some states, courts
of many such states will uphold its validity, if it is valid where performed,
as not ·being contrary to a settled state policy and affecting good morals.
Harrison v. Harrison, supra; Schofield v. Schofield, SI Pa. Super. Ct 564
See comment on this case in 61 UNIV. o:r' PA. LAW Rl;v. 490. Contra, Hayes
v. Rollins, 68 N. H. I9I. In the case of United States v. Rodgers, 109 Fed.
886, a wife who was the niece of her husband naturalized her~ was refused
admission to this country, the court holding such a marriage to be shocking
to the moral sense and contrary to the policy of Pennsylvania laws. The fact
that the parties have gone outside of the jurisdiction to marry in order to
evade the laws of the state of their domicile has been held to make no difference. Schofield v. Schofield, supra.
•
l!Fl~li!~·~···
PoWJ:Rs-Er<.11£Cr OF CovtNANT ro A:PPOINT.-A decedent, having an
equitable estate for life, had power to make such disposition of the estate
"for the benefit of himself and his children, by a l~st will and testament, or
by an appointment in the nature of a last will and testament, as he may desire." In 1905 he made a will in which he appointed $25,000.00 to the defendant in pursuance of a covenant that in consideration of $51000.00 he would
execute such appointment by an irrevocable will. Later he made a new will
iii which the power was executed in a manner inconsistent with the provisions "of the contract Held that the covenantee Was not entitled to specific
performance, and since the appointees received nothing that was the property
of the donee, there was nothing in their hal}ds that equity could charge with
a trust Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer, (N. Y. l9I6) II4 N. E.

389.
Equity will not enforce specific performance of a covenant which the
donee of a testamentary power .makes to the effect that he will awoint in
favor of certain objects, if he later makes appointments valid otherwise but
inconsistent therewith. In Re Parkin, [1892]- 3 Ch. 5IO; In Re Bradshaw,
[1902] I Ch. 342; Wilks v. Burns, 6o Md. 64 But if an appointment is made
in accordance with a prior contract, the fact that the donee is benefited by
preventing a liability for breach arising, does not make the appointment bad.
Coffin v. Cooper, 2 Dr. & Sm. 367; Palmer v. Locke, 15 Ch. D. 294 The
reason underlying the rule is that to grant sp'ecific performance would enlarge
a testamentary power into a power which could be exercised by deed, which
would defeat the intention of the donor. Reid v. Boushall, 107 N. C. 34S.
Where one had an inchoate power to appoint by deed upon reaching a certain
age, a covenant to appoint, made prior to attaining the prescribed age, was
enforced by equity as a defective execution in Johnson v. Touchet, 37. L.1. R.
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(N. S.) 25. When, ho{vever, the power may only be exercised by will, the
covenant to appoint cannot be said to be a. defective execution, and will not
. be aided in equity. Gaskins v. ·Finks,!)() Va. 384, 19 S. E. 166. In Learned v.
Talmadge, 26 Barb. 44,.1, a conveyance was made by the donee of a power to
one of the objects, and covenants were made that he would not make any disposition of the property by any will and that all of his interest was relinquished
and extinguished. Nevertheless appointments subsequently made were held
valid as against graritees of the covenantee. See also Re Collard and Duckworth, 16 Ont. Rep. 735. But the execution of a mortgage with full covenants
of warranty by the donee was held to estop him from inconsistent dealings
with the estate, and the appointees under the will had no further rights, in
Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N. E. 1004- Though an affirmative contract to appoint will not be specifically enforced, yet where the donee cove.nanted .that ·he would not exercise his power so as to reduce the share which a
particular beneficiary would receive on a default of appointment, it was held
to be a release of the power to ·appoint, and the power thereafter could only
be exercised subject to the fetter or limitation thus imposed by the negative
covenant, and appointments made inconsistent therewith were set aside to such
anc:xtentaswouldsatisfythecovenant. Re Evered, [1910] 2 Ch. 147. A release
of power can be made in England by virtue of statute, CoNVSYANCING
1881, .§52. A power in gross might be released, but the court refused to
consent to the proposition that the donee could by virtue of a "gainful agreement'' bind himsel(to refrain fro~ the exercise of a power, T.homso~s E~ec
utor v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489, 528. The court in the principal case did not
decide whethei: the contract was enforceaple against the estate of the decedent,
or void in totoK

a

Ac:r:·

SAI.~DA'YAGts FOR B~cR oF W AP.RANTY oF SJW>s.-Defendant sold
plaintiff melon seeds and expressly guaranteed them to be of a particular'
variety known as "Klekley SweetS." An examination of the seeds would not
have disclosed whether they were of this brand or not. Plaintiff prepared
soil and planted the seeds, which produced melons of a different and jnferior
variety; and plaintiff sued defendant for breach of warranty. Held, that the
measure of recoverable damages was the value of a crop such as would
ordinarily have been produced that year bad the seeds been as warranted,
less the value of the crop actually produced. Ford v. Farmer's E~ch., (Tenn.
1916) l8g
w. 368•
.Where seeds are warranted to be true to name and a crop of an inferior
quality is produced, it has generally been held that the measure of damages
should be the difference between the ·value of the crop Taised and the value
of the crop which would have been produced had the seeds been as guaranteed. This is the rule followed in the principal case and is supported by
Passenger v. Thorburn, 35 Ba11b. (N. Y.) 17; Schutt v. Baker, 9 Hun. (N. Y.)
536; Flick v. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 392. Where no crop is produced at all, or
if it is worthless, some cases allow us damages the expense of preparing the
soil (less the general benefit to the land therefrom), the price paid for the
seed, and the loss sustained from having the land lie idle. Phelps v. Elyria
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Milling Co., 12 Oh. Dec. 6g5; Vaugh~s Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla.
7o8. In following this rule practically the same result is obtained as is
reached by the cases in the first class, since the loss sustained from haying
the land idle is usually equivalent to the expected profits. A large number
of cases refuse to allow a recovery for losses due to the idleness of the
land and reach a different conclusion from that of the foregoing cases.
F~rris v. Comstock, Ferre & Co., 33 Conn. 513; Butler v. Moore, 68 Ga. 78o;
Reiger v. Worth Co., 127 N. C. 230.
SPi>CIFIC PtRFORMANCE-01" Bun.DING CoNTRAC't.-The defendant construction company agreed to construct a drainage system for an organized district, and agr.eed to receive monthly payments as the work progressed. The
first payments were to be in cash and the remainder in notes. After the
work was more than half completed and the defendant had received all the
cash under the contract, the defendant refused to proceed. Tlie work was in
imminent danger of being destroyed, and the surrounding lands injured by
overflow. It appeared that it was practically impossible to get another con.:.
tractor to complete the work within a reasonable time. Held, that upon a
finding that the notes were amply secured the lower court properly decreed
specific performance of the contract. Board of Commissioners v. Wills &
Sons, (D. C. 1916), 236 Fed. 362.
·
It is often stated that equity will not enforce a building contract because
to do so would require constant-supervision by the court. Armour v. Connolly, (N. J. 1901) 49 Atl. 1II7.i LaHogue Drainage Dist. v. 'Watts, 179 Feet
6go. FRY, SPWFIC Pm'oRMANO: (5th Ed.) 47. However, as early as 1694,
the court of chancery granted specific performance of a contract to build a
house at the petition of the land-owner's heir. Holt v. Holt, I Eq. Abr.
274, p. II. Specific performance is often granted in cases where the defendant ha5 agreed to build a structure on his own laiid, more especiatiy when
the land is conveyed to the defendant by the plairitiff upon that condition.
Murray v. N. W.R. R. Co., 64 S. C. 520, 42 S. E. 617; Parrott v. Atl. & N.
C. R. R. Co., 165 N. C. 295, 81 S. E. 348. These cases show that there is
no inherent disa:bility in a court of equity, preventing it from granting specific performance of a building contract. In most cases wh.ere the structure
is to be on the plaintiff's land the remedy at law is perfectly adequate, for
the plaintiff can hire another to perform the <:ontract and recover damages
from the defendant in an action at law. In such cases specific performance
is rightly refused. Likewise a court is justified in denying equitable relief
where the contract is too indefinite, even when the remedy at Jaw is inadequate. Ward v. Newbold, II5 Md. 689, 81 Atl. 793; see also Jones v.
Parker, 163 Mass. 564- In the principal case, however, the remedy at law
is clearly inadequate and the terms of the contract sufficiently definite to
grant specific performance.
Tl;:NANCY IN CoM:MON-CoNVSYANO: BY ConNAN't OF SPW.FIC PRoPmaY.A tenant in common who owned an undivided five-eighteenths of a tract of
land comprising ninety-nine acres, deeded twenty-seven acres of same to de-
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fendant, describing the portion so conveyed by metes and bounds. Complainants, who are also part owners of the land, bring this suit against defendant alone for partition of such particular part. Held, defendant is entitled to have the ~tire tract valued, and have set apart to it, in severalty,
such portion as represents five-eighteenths in value of the whole, and if upon
such valuation it shall appear that the twenty-seven acres are not of greater
value than five-eighteenths of the· entire tract the decree will direct the allotment thereof to the defendant, Qr if a part thereof is found to be of such
value, such part should be allotted. Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 235
Fed. 465.
As to the exact interest which is passed by such a deed, the courts are
· not agreed. They do agree, however, that the grantee has no absolute right·
on partition to have the described land allotted to him, and that the determination reached must leave the rights of other tenants unprejudiced.
Beyond this there is conflict. It was early held that a conveyance of this
sort was absolutely void. Griswold v. Johnson, 5 Conn. 363, but that decision was later modified by the same court when it concluded that the
deed would be validated if the other co-tenants choose to. affirm it. In some
jurisdictions the effect of the gtant is contingent upon the result of the
partition suit. I~ by chance the portion conveyed happens to be set off as
1)ie share of the grantor it passes, otherwise the grantee takes nothing.
Cressey v. Cressy, 215 Mass, 65, 102· N. E. 314; Kenoye v. Brown, 82 Miss.
007, 35 So. 163; Benedict v. Torrenf, 83 Mich. 181, 47 N. W. 129. Another
vie~ .is that llie grantee t:ikes the interest of the grantor, whatever that may
be." Lessee of White v. Sayre, 2 Ohio IIO. The decision in the principal case
is more favoraole to the grantee than any of these, since he acquires the
interest. of his grantor, and unless other equities interfere is, upon partition,
allotted 'the land described in ·his deed. This determination may be open
to the objection that the equity of the grantee, in the land described, is
given more weight· than would be accorded a desire on the part of the
grantor to •be allotted some particular portion. · This might lead to colorable conveyances. Such a possibility would be obviated by permittjng the
deed to pass the interest of the grantor, but denying it any influence on the
result of the partition. The instant case is supported by the following:
Ha"ell v. Mason, 170 Ala. 282, 54 So. 164; Worthington -v. Staunton, 16 W.
Va. 209; Young v. Edwards, 33 s. c.. 404 II s. E. 1o66; Maverick v. Barney,
88 Tex. 56o, 32 S. W. 5I2; MoonJshine Co. v. Dunman, SI Tex. Civ. App.
159, III S. W. I6I.
TRIAl.-Stl'ARATION oF JURY AFT£R FIN.AI, StmMISSION oF CASE.-In a
civil ease the jury stated to the associate, after the judge had left the court
one evening, that 'they had agree~ to a verdict on two counts but could not
agree on the third, and they then separated for the night. Coming before
the judge the next morning they gave a verdict on all three counts. Judgment was entered on the verdict sc; rendered and accepted. Held, that the
verdict was valid inasmuch as no prejudice was shown. Fan.shaw v. Knowles,
(1916] 2 K. B. 539:

'RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
The precise point raised in the principal case apparently had never been
passed upon definitely by an Engli~h court prior to- this time. The counsel for
the appellant urged that the rule applicable to criminal trials should govern. the
decision of this, a civil case. To quote from a recent leading case that rule
is as follows: ''If a juror after the judge has summed up in any criminal
trial separates from his colleagues, and not being under the control of the
court, converses or is in a position to converse with other persons, it is
an irregularity which in the opinion of the court renders the whole proceedings abortive, :md the only course open to the court is to discharge the
jury and commence the proceedings afresh." Rex. v. Ketteridge, [1915]
l K. B. 467. The court deciding that case did not think it necessary to consider what had actually taken place, nor whether the irregularity had in fact
prejudiced the prisoner. However, there was in that case no suggestion
that this same rule would apply in the case of a civil trial. While, as stated
above, this precise question was treated by the court as one of first impression, there is strong evidence that at an early date the strict rule applicable to criminal cases was relaxed under some circumstances insofar as civil
trials were concerned. Con, LITTLS'!ON, 227; 3 BLACKSTONE, Col.DI., 377;
Lord St. John v. Abbott, Barnes 441, 94 Eng. Rep. 994- The principal case
states definitely for the first time that "the rule is that when there has been
a separation, that is a circumstance which with other circumstances ought
to be taken into account and dealt with by the court." In the United States
the general rule is that a separation in civil trials must be prejudicial to invalidate the verdict, even when the separation takes place before the jury
have arrived at a verdict. SpeiJcer v. John.son, 185 Mich. 85, l5I N. W. 684;
Liverpool &c. Ins. Co. v. N. & M. Friedman Co., 133 Fed. 713, 66 C. C. A.
543· It thus appears that the English Court of Appeal, without referring in
any way to ,American decisions, has reached a conclusion identical with the
rule which has always been in force in this country.
Wn.r.s-EFacT oF RsvocATION UPON FAII.~ oF TH£ PURPOst FOR Wmc:e:
IT WAS MAD:t.-Under a marriage settlement for her life, with remainder as
she should appoint, testatrix made an appointment for the benefit of her
daughter, M., then later by codicil expressly revoked the" same, and made a
new appointment whereby the fund was to be held in trust for the benefit of
the said M., for life, then to such other daughters of testatrix as should
survive M. The new appointment in the codicil was void under the rule
against perpetuities, and M. now seeks to determine whether the codicil, being void as an appointment, was also void as a revocation of the earlier appointment. Held, that the intention of the testatrix was I).Ot to revoke the
prior appointment in any case, but only for the purpose of carrying out the
altered appointment, and since the purpose of the revocation had failed, the
revocation also failed. In re Bernard's Settlement, [1916] l Ch. 552, 85 L. J.
Ch. 414Where a will or codicil is duly executed by a competent person, but its
provisions cannot be given effect, as when void as a perpetUity, (Altrock v.
Vanderburgh, 25 N. Y. Supp. 851)", or a bequest to a charity which fails be0
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cause of uncertainty, (Dudley v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440, 83 ·N. W. 97), or·because not made a ·sufficient length of time before the death of the testator,
(Price v. ¥aswell, 28 Pa. 23), or if an appointment is made in excess of
the powervf the donee, (Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357), the general rule
is that a clause expressly revoking a "prior will or provision is not affected
by the failure of the disposition attempted to be made. . Tupper v. Tupper, 1
. Kay & J. 665; Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679, L. R. A 1916 C. g8,
and µote. . Where the revocation is not expressed, but merely implied from
a provision in the later instrument which is inconsistent with the prior disposition, the revocation is only to such an extent as is necessary to give ef-:
feet to the later provision, he1we there is no revocation at all if .the later
··. provision is vqid. Austin v. Oakes, II7 N. Y. 577, 23 N. E. 193; Eli v. M egie,
'(N. Y. 1916), n3 N. E. Boo, semble; Duguid v:. Fras~r, 31 Ch. D. 449, 55 L. J;
~h. 285. In the principal case, where the revocation was by express
words, the court has advanced beyond the liolding in Duguid
Fraser,
where the revocation was only by implication, and says: "It d~es not
· seem that the real point' depends upon the question of whether there
are words of direct revocation, or whether such words are absent."
See also Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 At}. I53. which is in ac'cord with the principal case, but stands alone in this country.· The question·
in these cases must not be confuse<;\ .with the question in Onions v. Tyrer,· 1 P •.
Wins. 343; Rudy.v. Ulrich, 6!) Pa. St. 177, and Moore v. Rowlett, 26!) Ill. 88,
109 N; E. 682, L R. A 19i6 C. 89, and .note, where the subsequent provision
fails because of a defect in the execution of the later instrument, or in the
:capacity of the person, when it is void in toto, ~ence a clause expressly revo~~ the prior instrument "falls with the devise.
.
..
,
Wn.I.S-Pow:i;;a oF SAI.t G1vts NO Powa TO MoRTGAGt.-It was pr~vided
in a will that the devisee of a life estate, the wife of the testator, had ''the
right to dispose of-any property as she may think best for the purpose of
paying all just debts or supporting or maintaining herself and children,;"
and under this power ~e widow executed a mortgage of the fee to .the defendant. The-children of the testator, who by the will were entitled to "the
entire property reI)laining" at the death or marriage of the life-tenant, urge
that the mortgage is not binding on th~ interest in the remainder. Held,
that the mortgage in fee was void, since the power to sell did not include
the power to m6rtgage, nor could she by sale or mortgage bind any interest
in the estate except her own. Sheffield v. Grieg, (S. C. 1916) 89 S. E. 664.
That a mere power to one to sell does not include a .power to mortgage,
is the general rule, as followed in the instant case, especially if the one having
the power is a mere agent or attorney. Jeffrey v. Hursh, 49 Mich. 31, 12
N. W. 898. The executor with "entire management and control," does not
have power to make a mortgage, (Price v. Courtney, 8g Mo. 387, 56 Am. St.
453), nor can a trustee with power to sell and invest the proceeds, make a
.mortgage (Hannah v. Carnahan, 65 Mich. 6o1, 32 N. W. 835). The power of
the ,devisee of a life .estate to ·sell a fee was restricted so as not to include
a power to mortgap;e by the application of the broad general rule, in Hoyt
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v. Jaques, 129 Mass. 286, the court holding that "a power to sell imports a
sale 'ottt and out' and will not authorize a mortgage, unless something in the
will shows that a mortgage was within the intention of the testator." See
also Bloomer v. Waldron, 3 Hill 36I. Opposed to the general rule is Zane
v. Kennedy, 73 Pa. 182, where the court holds· that_ an "absolute and unrestricted power to sell includes a power to mortgage," on the theory that
a mortgage is a conditional sale. The rule is not without its exception, for in Ball v. Harris, 4 Myl. & Cra. 264 it was said that 'it had been
settled since the decision of Mills v. Banks, 3 P. Wms. 9 in 1724 that where
an estate is devised with a charge imposed, or a power to rais~ a sum of
money, power to sell includes a power to mortgage. In Loebenthal v. Raleigh,
36 N. J. Eq. 16g, a mortgage was allowed to be made where the power to
sell was for the purpose of raising a sum sufficient to pay de'bts, and it appeared to the court that the "purpose could be answered better by mortgage
than by sale." Where one is the devisee of a life esta~e and has the power
to sell for "support and maintenance," many courts are inclined to modify
the general rule and; under the power of sale to permit a mortgage. In ·
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 149 Ia. 32i, 128 N. W. 38<>, the court says that a power
to sell given to an agent, trustee, or attorney, which power is strictly construed, and generally held not to include a power to mortgage, is to be distinguished from a testamentary power, given not for the .benefit and profit
of the donor, but
furtherance of some benefit intended to be conferred
on the donee; and unless the intention clearly appears otherwise, the authority to mortgage for the purpose expressed in the writing will be inferred.
This modification has also been allowed· by the courts in the· cases of Kent
v. Morrison, 153 Mass. 137, 26 N. E. 4271 IO L. R. A. 756; McCreary v. Bomberger, 151 Pa. 323, 24 Atl. ro66; Swarlhouth v. Ranier, 143 N. Y. 499, 38
N. E. 726. See also 20 HARv. L. Rm-. 568, and IS Mien. L. Rm'. 331.

m:

WILr,s-Sor.n!ERS AND StAM~N.-The privilege provided by §n of the
Wills Act of 1837, that any soldier being in actual military service or mariner
or seaman being at sea may dispose of his 'personal estate as he might have
done before the passing of the act, was claimed for each of two 1lllattested
papers offered for probate. In the first case the deceased had volunteered
and had lbeen ordered to report for duty in the Naval Sick Berth Service.
The writing was executed after receiving orders to embark but before he
had actually joined the ship. Held, that the papers were inadmissable for
probate, for, although the deceased .was a seaman, he ·had not yet been at sea.
Estate of Anderson, [1916] Pro. 49, 85 L. J. Pro. 21.
In the seeond case, a female nurse had been employed on· a hospital ship
under engagement with the War Office. When the writing was executed
she was on shore leave but had received orders to embark. Held, that the
paper was entitled to probate as the wi11 of a soldier "being in actual military service." Estate of Stanley, tr916] Pro. 192, 85 L. J. Pro. 222.
The privilege of having an informal writing probated as a will ·of personalty has been interpreted so as to be available not only to "mariners and
seamen," both common seamen and officers, (Goods of Hays, 2 Curt. Eccl.

Rep. 338)~ whether ~gaged in the merchant marine or naval service, (Hubb~rd v. Hubbard, 8 N. Y. lg6), but also to anyone employed on the shlp,
for example, the ship cook, (.Ex Parle Thompson, 4 Bradf. 154), a female
typist. (In the Goods of Ha~e, [1915] 2 Ir. Rep. 362), and a female nurse,
(Estate of Stanley, supra) ; but no.t to one a passenger when the writing was
executed, ¢.ough !by profession a mariner. (Warren v. Harding, 2 R. I. 133).
A 11eaman is "at sea'' within the reqti.irements of the statute, while in the
COl}J'Se of the voyage, though the vessel ~Y actually be in a port and the de-:
cea,sed on sho~e. :.{.ay's Goods, 2 Curt. Eccl. Rep. 375. A vessel lying il;l the
Thames ri~er preparatory to setting sail is "at sea." Goods of Patterson.,
79 L. T. N. S. 123; but where the ship remained in port for fifte~ days
after a sailor had signed articles, a writing executed during that time was
not privileged since the deceased had not been "at sea." Corby's Goods,
~-Eng. L. & Eq..Rep. 004. Nor was a vessel "at sea" when lying on the
Mississippi river above the ebb and flow of the tide. Gi,Wt{s Will, l Tu~er
44- Where a soldier who had just entered the barracks attempted to make
a will, it was held good because he had taken a steP which brought him within
the terms of the statute, even though he had not received orders to embark.
Goods of Hiscock, [1901] Pio. 78, 84 L. T. N. S. 61. That orders for mobilization, without orders to em'bark, constituted a force in expeditione, was held
in Gattward v. Knee, [1902] Pro. 99, 86 L. T. N. S. u9, 4 B. R. C. 895. A
paper written by a soldie~ in camp before his company was mustered into
the service of the United States,' was' held not entitled to probate in Von.
Deuser v. Gordon, 39 Vt. III, and Pierce v. Pierc.e, 41) Ind. 86. Though at,
t;he time he had facilities fc;ir making a formal will, being ill a hospital in the'
tjty .of .Washington, a soldier was in "actual military service" who had been
fighting at the front, but was now unable to proceed with his company
which was still in active service. Gould v. Stafford's ~state, 39 Vt. 4g8. The
distinction which seems to be recognized in" this country is as stated in In re
Smith: 6 Phila. 104. .where a writing made by a soldier while home on a. furlough, was offe!'."ed for probate, and the court said, ''The term 'soldiers !n
actual military services' in«<ludes those engaged in the active duties of the
field, whether on the march, in temporary camp, the battle, siege, or bivouac,
but ~ never ·apply to th~ soldier who is in i:egular quarters or at his cus..
tomarr ho~e on leave of absence."

